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SUPREME COURT OF NEW JERSEY
DOCKET NO. 089278

IN RE SUPREME COURT	:	ON PETITION FOR REVIEW
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON	:	UNDER RULE 1:19-8
PROFESSIONAL ETHICS	:	
OPINION NO. 745	:	
	:	

BRIEF OF NEW JERSEY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR
STAY OF ENFORCEMENT OF ACPE OPINION 745

Of Counsel:

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PRELIMINARY STATEMENT

The conflict between the decades-long practice of certified attorneys paying referral fees to out-of-state attorneys, in good faith reliance on Rule 1:39-6(d), and the new interpretation of the Rule given by the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (“ACPE”) in its Opinion 745 (“Opinion”), gives rise to the critical need for a stay of enforcement of the Opinion until the Supreme Court issues a final determination on the various Petitions for Review that have been filed. In balancing the equities, more harm will occur if the Opinion is left to stand pending review than if a stay is imposed. The ACPE believes it does not have authority to issue a stay, despite having done so previously. See In re ACPE Op. 621, 128 N.J. 577, 584 (1992) (“The ACPE stayed the effect of its opinion pending disposition of the issue by the Court”) and see Exhibit A at A1, NJSBA May 10, 2024 letter to ACPE, and Exhibit B at A4, ACPE response. The New Jersey State Bar Association (“NJSBA”) therefore respectfully requests the Supreme Court to issue a stay of enforcement of the Opinion pending its review.

Rule 1:39 has permitted referral fees to be paid without responsibility or any participation in the matter for nearly four decades. See R. 1:39-6(d). New Jersey’s Certified Trial Attorneys (“CTAs”) have always understood that this Rule permitted referral fees to be paid to out-of-state attorneys. This has been bolstered by references in case law and disciplinary opinions to a prohibition on

the payment of referral fees by attorneys who are not certified, and the lack of any reference to a prohibition on the payment of such fees to out-of-state attorneys. See Johnson v. McLellan, 468 N.J. Super. 562, 572, fn 4, and 579, fn 7.; In the Matter of David A. Bolson, DRB 12-148 (November 7, 2012). The conflict between the pronouncements in the Opinion and the widely understood interpretation of the rules governing referral fees by CTAs gives rise to imminent and serious issues for CTAs who have, in good faith, accepted out-of-state referrals and have committed in writing to the payment of referral fees.

A CTA has three choices upon the resolution of a pending matter that has been referred by an out-of-state attorney, in the aftermath of Opinion 745. One, an attorney may refuse to pay the referral fee “earned” at the time of referral and risk a claim for breach of contract. Two, the attorney may pay the referral fee in the face of a clear pronouncement by the ACPE that the payment of such a fee is not ethical and risk prosecution for an ethical violation. Three, the attorney may retain the referral fee funds until the requested review of Opinion 745 is resolved. Each option presents legal, ethical, or practical problems. The ACPE, in its briefing in this matter, has suggested that the Court may allow those attorneys who have a pre-existing contractual obligation to pay a referral fee to do so without any ethical implications. See ACPE brief at 19-20. That does not

completely address the issues presented, however, particularly with regard to litigants whose cases arise while the Court's review is pending.

New Jersey's CTA program identifies competent and experienced New Jersey trial attorneys and encourages, through the payment of a referral fee pursuant to Rule 1:39-6, attorneys to refer matters to CTAs. Opinion 745 eliminates the availability of referral fees to out-of-state attorneys and may disincentivize those out-of-state attorneys from making an immediate referral, resulting in harm to the public. Time is critical when issues such as tort claims notices or other procedural hurdles are potentially present. A litigant's rights may be lost while an out-of-state attorney waits to determine the outcome of the pending Petitions for Review. CTAs may decline to accept a proposed referral from an out-of-state attorney because of the potential exposure and legal peril, depriving competent counsel to the out-of-state litigant.

The NJSBA respectfully requests that the Court stay the imposition of Opinion 745 until the Court addresses the filed Petitions for Review.

LEGAL ARGUMENT

I. THE COURT SHOULD STAY THE ENFORCEMENT OF ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON PROFESSIONAL ETHICS OPINION 745.

The Court may stay the enforcement of an ACPE Opinion. See In Re Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 635, 125 N.J. 181, 184 (1991). The standard for the granting of a stay is discretionary and dependent on the equities of a given case. A party seeking a stay must demonstrate that (1) irreparable harm will result from enforcement; (2) the appeal presents a meritorious issue, and movant has a likelihood of success on the merits; and (3) balancing the "relative hardships to the parties reveals that greater harm would occur if a stay is not granted than if it were." McNeil v. Legislative Apportionment Commission of NJ, 176 N.J. 484, 486 (2003) (LaVecchia, J., dissenting) (citing Crowe v. DeGioia, 90 N.J. 126, 132-34 (1982)).

A. The Enforcement of Opinion 745 Will Result in Irreparable Harm.

Irreparable harm will result if Opinion 745 is not stayed. Numerous matters have been referred to New Jersey CTAs by out-of-state attorneys with the expectation of a referral fee to be paid pursuant to Rule 1:39-6. This obligation to pay a referral fee is universally reduced to writing to prevent ambiguity and constitutes a valid and enforceable contract. Referring attorneys

are not jointly responsible for the matters referred, nor have they participated in handling the matter. The vast majority have not sought *pro hac vice* status. Opinion 745 now calls into question the ethical propriety of paying these attorneys the referral fee they earned upon the referral of the matter, and which has been acknowledged in writing by the CTA.

CTAs have legal obligations that arise at the time a matter is referred. See Eichen, Levinson & Crutchlow, LLP v. Weiner, 397 N.J. Super. 588, 595 (App. Div. 2008) (holding a CTA had obligation to pay referring disbarred attorney's trustee because referral was made prior to referring attorney's disbarment); see also Ravich, Koster, Tobin, Oleckna, Reitman & Greenstein, P.C. v. Gourvitz, 287 N.J. Super. 533, 539 (App. Div. 1996) (holding referral fee is a legal obligation owed to referring lawyer), aff'd, 147 N.J. 170 (1996). The Eichen opinion draws a critical distinction between "fees for legal services" and the referral fee at question in the case.

In Eichen, 397 N.J. Super. at 591-92, the Appellate Division addressed whether a referral fee must be paid to the trustee for a disbarred attorney's legal practice. The law firm, which had successfully settled many cases that the disbarred attorney had referred, refused to pay the referral fees to the trustee because the referring attorney was disbarred at the time the cases settled. Ibid. The Appellate Division explained the legal obligation became due at the time

the referral was made, calling it a “financial obligation.” Id. at 598. More importantly, the appellate court did not consider the referral fees in question to constitute “legal fees,” but considered them to be “other compensation.” The relevant portion of Rule 1:20-20(b)(13) refers to: “all legal fees for legal services and other compensation due the [disbarred] attorney.” The Eichen firm argued that it could not pay the requested fees to the trustee because they constituted “legal fees.” The Court disagreed:

We interpret a referral fee, once paid, to constitute a form of “other compensation” under Rule 1:20-20(b)(13). When an attorney refers client files to another attorney, the referring attorney has “assign[ed] or transfer[ed] an[] aspect of [that] attorney's share of a law firm.” Ibid. Weiner, as the referring attorney, relinquished all further professional responsibility for the handling of those files once the Eichen firm filed a substitution of attorney. Under such circumstances, we conclude that the referral of those files constituted an “assignment or transfer,” ibid., of a portion of Weiner's law practice, thereby entitling him to eventual compensation in the form of a referral fee for the files that he relinquished. **We thus conclude that Weiner's right to receive the referral fee is a form of “other compensation due the [disbarred] attorney.”** (emphasis added). Id. at 594.

The Ravich opinion, 287 N.J. Super. 533, addressed the obligation of a CTA to pay a referral fee to a forwarding attorney, under circumstances where the CTA was no longer associated with the legal entity which had accepted the initial referral.¹ The appellate court held that the obligation to pay a referral fee was personal to the CTA, and survived defendant’s moving between law firms:

¹ This case, involving a referred matrimonial matter, pre-dated the certification of matrimonial lawyers and the prohibition on the payment of referral fees in matrimonial matters.

Because the case was referred to defendant, he remains liable on his agreement to pay a referral fee. When he brought his matters into the newly-formed firm it should have been with the understanding that there was an outstanding referral obligation. One can assign assets but cannot assign liabilities. The responsibility to pay plaintiff's referral fee was and is defendant's personal liability. Id. at 539.

This case clearly identifies the legal jeopardy a CTA faces in declining to pay a promised referral fee.

Parenthetically, in his dissent, Judge Michels – who vehemently opposed the concept of referral fees – noted:

Merely recommending another lawyer to a client or referring a client to another lawyer is not the performance of a legal service or the discharge of responsibility. Id.

These cases illustrate how the failure to pay a promised referral fee can quickly become the subject of costly litigation and place a CTA who declines to pay a promised referral fee in legal jeopardy. It is possible for an out-of-state referring attorney to sue a New Jersey CTA for a referral fee, obligating the attorney to defend an action for abiding by the ACPE's advisory opinion. ACPE opinions are not binding on New Jersey courts, although they are arguably persuasive. Under these circumstances, however, Opinion 745 may not serve as an adequate defense to a claim by a referring attorney that a "financial obligation" created at the time of the referral must be honored.

On the other hand, paying a promised referral fee to an out-of-state attorney may cause a CTA, who acted in good faith reliance on the decades-long

interpretation of Rule 1:39-6(d) before the Opinion, to face an ethics issue. The ACPE's published opinions are binding on a county ethics committee in the disposition of all matters. R. 1:19-6. "An attorney who fails to follow an Advisory Committee opinion does so at his [or her] peril." Higgins v. Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics of Supreme Court, 73 N.J. 123, 127 (1977).

This illustrates the particularly difficult position CTAs face. Both forwarding and referring attorneys reasonably expected that a referral fee would be paid. Opinion 745 casts doubt on that obligation without having the force of law, creating a quandary between ethics and law. Many CTAs will most likely hold funds for the "financial obligation" created by the referral fee until the Petitions for Review are addressed, but this is not a viable temporary solution. A tax issue is certain to arise because the funds in question are revenue for either the law firm who received the referral or the law firm who initiated the referral, yet neither has received the benefit of the actual funds at the time the tax obligation is due.

These tax ramifications are a crisis for law firms operating on a June 30 to July 1 fiscal year. Attorneys and their accountants will, of course, diligently attempt to determine how to account for these funds in a manner that complies with the attorney's ethical obligations and does not violate any tax obligations.

It is conceivable that attorneys will have to hold funds for many months, or longer, under these uncertain conditions.

Finally, irreparable harm is likely to occur to potential clients nationwide with New Jersey-based claims, who have not yet been advised by a CTA versed in New Jersey procedural and substantive law. Out-of-state attorneys may delay referring cases to a New Jersey attorney to await the outcome of the Court's potential review in this matter. Such a delay may, unbeknownst to the out-of-state attorney, cause peril for litigants, because there are strict time and substantive requirements for various types of litigation, such as the need to file a Tort Claims Notice or an Affidavit of Merit. An additional element of irreparable harm is visited upon these same potential clients, when the CTA selected by the forwarding attorney declines to undertake the representation of the referred client, because of the potential for negative consequences as a result of the representation. Will a CTA accept a referral and issue a written promise to pay a referral fee under the current circumstances? The chilling effect of Opinion 745 will pose a significant contraindication to the acceptance of an otherwise worthy case proffered to the CTA. Many would argue that the wisest course of action for the CTA is to decline the referral, and avoid the potential for litigation or an ethics violation. This choice, while arguably in the best

interests of the CTA, poses a very real pitfall for the innocent party seeking competent New Jersey legal representation.

By contrast, the ACPE, in its briefing in this matter, fails to point to any real harm that has been suffered as a result of the payment of referral fees to out-of-state attorneys by CTAs. On the contrary, the ACPE recommends that attorneys be permitted to honor any existing referral fee contracts, and implies that a Rule change may be worth considering. See ACPE brief at 19-20. This illustrates the lack of harm in implementing a stay of the Opinion and allowing the practice of paying referral fees by CTAs to out-of-state attorneys to continue while the Court reviews the merits of the Petitions.

In summary, irreparable harm will result if Opinion 745 is enforced; no harm will result if the Opinion is stayed pending this Court's review. The Court should stay enforcement of Opinion 745 and allow the Court to address the Petitions for Review filed by the NJSBA and others.

B. The NJSBA and Other Entities Have Raised Meritorious Issues in Support of the Petitions For Review That are Likely to Succeed.

The NJSBA, along with other bar associations and a law firm, have filed Petitions for Review of Opinion 745. Each of these Petitions raises meritorious arguments with respect to why Opinion 745 should be reversed. These

arguments are based on a plain reading of the Rule, settled law, existing case law, and over 40 years of practice with no indication to the contrary. New Jersey courts and the Disciplinary Review Board have not limited the payment of referral fees to New Jersey attorneys. Opinion 745 is the first occasion any reference has been made to such a limitation.

The Supreme Court may affirm, reverse, or modify the ACPE's opinion. R.1:19-8(g). Since an appellate court's review of issues regarding the interpretation of laws, statutes, or rules is *de novo*, the Opinion is not accorded any specific deference and the standard of review for a Petition for Review of an ACPE Opinion that involves a Rule interpretation is *de novo*. See In re Ridgfield Park Bd. of Educ., 244 N.J. 1, 17 (2020) (agency's interpretation of a statute subject to *de novo* review).

The NJSBA filed a Petition for Review, joined by several county bar associations. They argue that the ACPE misinterpreted the plain language of Rule 1:39-1 through 1:39-9 and ignores long established rules of statutory construction by concluding that "attorney," as it appears in Rule 1:39-6, means only "New Jersey attorney." Further, the Opinion confuses a referral fee paid by a certified attorney pursuant to Rule 1:39-6 with a fee for legal services that must be divided pursuant to RPC 1.5(e). These payments are each unique, and they are separate and distinct from each other. The Opinion also potentially

harms clients with claims that must be brought in New Jersey courts because it eliminates the incentive for out-of-state lawyers to refer cases to certified attorneys deemed by this Supreme Court to possess the requisite skill, knowledge, experience, and competence to handle complex cases, for the betterment of New Jersey clients.

The New Jersey Association for Justice (“NJAJ”) filed a Petition for Review. The NJAJ asserts that Opinion 745 incorrectly labels the referral of a client a “legal service,” without explanation or legal support, resulting in an interpretation of Rule 1:39-6(d) that contradicts our courts and the ACPE’s previous guidance. Further, the Opinion contradicts the fundamental underpinning of the certification program in New Jersey, which is designed to identify qualified and experienced practitioners and promote referrals to those practitioners.

The Trial Attorneys of New Jersey (“TANJ”) and the American Board of Trial Advocates (“ABOTA”) filed a Petition for Review. TANJ and ABOTA contend that Opinion 745 relies upon an incorrect definition of a referral fee. The Opinion will also impede the ability of clients to obtain representation from certified attorneys.

The law firm, Blume, Forte, Fried, Zerres & Molinari, P.C., also filed a Petition for Review. The firm submits that Opinion 745 contradicts and confuses

the basic distinctions between referral fees under Rule 1:39-6(d) and the division of participation fees for legal services rendered under RPC 1.5. It also argues that the Opinion misconstrues the purpose of the Supreme Court's recognition of certified attorneys under Rule 1:39, et seq., that will adversely affect the citizens of New Jersey, the New Jersey bar and professional interests of New Jersey practitioners.

The Petitions for Review filed on behalf of the NJSBA and other entities are likely to be successful. They present persuasive arguments to establish that Opinion 745 sets forth an interpretation of Rule 1:39-6 that is legally unsupported and in conflict with the plain reading of the Rule. Further, in its briefing in this matter, the ACPE is unable to point to any support for its interpretation of the language in Rule 1:39-6 in the Rule itself. It admits that it must draw upon inferences based on language elsewhere in the Rules. The NJSBA submits that the ACPE's analysis is misplaced, while the plain reading of the Rule by the NJSBA and others is wholly supported by statutory construction caselaw.

The widespread opposition to Opinion 745 by the New Jersey legal community and certified practitioners is rooted in the longstanding understanding of the rule, the agreement by previous courts and court committees that have touched on the issue, the lack of any indication to the

contrary over 40 years of practice, the numerous meritorious issues raised in the Petitions for Review, and the ACPE's inability to point to any harm raised by the practice and its misguided analysis of the language of the Rule. All of these establish a likelihood that Petitioners will prevail and support granting the request for a stay of the Opinion's enforcement.

C. Great Hardship Will Be Suffered by the Public and Certified Trial Attorneys if Opinion 745 is Not Stayed.

Both the public and certified trial attorneys will be significantly harmed by the failure to grant a stay. In contrast, Opinion 745 does not protect any party currently suffering harm nor does it advance an important public interest.

The public has benefitted from being referred to those attorneys deemed "certified" by the Supreme Court to represent them in resolving their grievances. For over 40 years, there have been no reported disciplinary opinions resulting from the payment of referral fees to out-of-state attorneys. In its briefing in this matter, the ACPE did not point to any harm caused by the practice and even consented to allowing the practice to continue in a limited way in those pending matters where referral fees have been promised to referring out-of-state attorneys. See ACPE brief at 19-20. On the other hand, if Opinion 745 stands, the public may not be represented by attorneys deemed certified by the Supreme Court and their rights may be adversely and permanently affected when out-of-

state law firms delay making case referrals pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's review.

In addition, lawyers who acted in good faith reliance on the longstanding interpretation of the Rule may face ethical charges and contractual breaches. Opinion 745 will expose lawyers who have received referrals from out-of-state attorneys, but now resist paying referral fees, to potential lawsuits for recovery of those fees. There are also potential tax issues associated with the holding of monies in a law firm's accounts that previously would have been paid as a referral fee.

As illustrated above, unless a stay of enforcement of Opinion 745 is imposed while the Petitions for Review are pending, both the public and certified trial attorneys will suffer great harm. On the contrary, even the ACPE appears to concede there would be no harm in allowing certified trial attorneys to continue to pay referral fees to out-of-state attorneys when it suggests the Court may allow existing referral arrangements to continue and may consider adding affirmative language to the Court Rules addressing the practice.

CONCLUSION

Opinion 745's guidance sharply contrasts with the current understanding of Rule 1:39. It represents a dramatic deviation from the established practice and understanding that CTAs are permitted to pay a referral fee to out-of-state attorneys who refer a matter without performing legal services or retaining joint responsibility. This practice has not been previously questioned or challenged because it is consistent with the plain wording of Rule 1:39-6.

It is respectfully submitted that Opinion 745 is a solution seeking a problem. The problem is non-existent, and the solution creates a labyrinth of legal issues fraught with exposure for a CTA, while creating a host of issues for potential clients, and irreparably damaging existing legal relationships. There will be no harm to suspend the imposition of Opinion 745, but great harm will occur if it is allowed to persevere during a review process which is likely to result in its reversal. The New Jersey Supreme Court should stay the imposition of Opinion 745 until the review process is complete.

Respectfully submitted,
New Jersey State Bar Association

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Dated: June 28, 2024

APPENDIX / EXHIBITS



NEW JERSEY STATE BAR ASSOCIATION

May 10, 2024

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Re: *In Re: Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 745*
Docket No. 089278

Dear Renee:

Thank you for speaking with NJSBA General Counsel Sharon A. Balsamo on behalf of the members of the New Jersey State Bar Association (NJSBA). Following up on that conversation, this will confirm that the NJSBA consents to a 30-day extension of time for you to file your brief.

This will also follow-up on our conversation about the NJSBA's request for the Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics (ACPE) to stay the enforceability of Opinion 745 pending the outcome of Supreme Court review. This action is not novel, as the enforcement of previous ACPE opinions have been stayed when the situation warranted it, either by the ACPE or the Court.

In *In re ACPE Op. 621*, 128 N.J. 577 (1992), a part-time legislative aide and other parties challenged an ACPE opinion placing certain restrictions on the aide when representing private parties. The decision says, "The ACPE stayed the effect of its opinion pending disposition of the issue by the Court." *Id.* at 584. In a later matter, the Court issued a stay in *In re ACPE Op. 635*, 125 N.J. 181 (1991), where the Clients' Security Fund and the Office of Attorney Ethics sought review of an ACPE opinion approving an "Authorization to Endorse" form. Similarly, the chair of the Unauthorized Practice of Law Committee granted a stay in *In re UPL Op. 24*, 128 N.J. 114 (1992), when independent paralegals challenged a UPL opinion concluding their unsupervised practice was the unauthorized practice of law. For the reasons expressed below, the NJSBA now respectfully requests that the ACPE take similar action in this matter and stay enforcement of Opinion 745 until final guidance is provided by the Supreme Court.

In this case, Opinion 745 is contrary to what many, if not most, certified attorneys believed R. 1:39-6(d) allows, particularly with regard to accepting referrals from out of state attorneys and paying referral fees. These attorneys, deemed by the Supreme Court to meet heightened requirements regarding education, experience, knowledge and skill, do not take their professional obligations lightly. They are diligent in ensuring they practice within the guidelines provided by the Court Rules and Rules of Professional Conduct. Opinion 745 has wrought quite a bit of grief and chaos for these attorneys who, in good faith, believed they were ethically able to pay referral fees to out of state attorneys.

The NJSBA Petition for Review sets forth the arguments why the Association and its members believe the ACPE's analysis in this matter was flawed. We understand the review process is available to seek additional Supreme Court guidance and we have availed ourselves of that process on behalf of our members.

However, while that review is ongoing, many attorneys, and their law firms, face a number of quandaries in attempting to comply with the Opinion as written. They have voiced several concerns: (1) the effect of the Opinion on matters that were accepted in good faith from out of state attorneys with a promise to pay a referral fee; (2) the potential tax ramifications of holding case proceeds in an attorney's/law firm's accounts that previously would have been paid as a referral fee, but are now in question; and (3) the effect on litigants and the potential jeopardizing of their rights if out of state law firms delay making any case referrals pending the outcome of the Supreme Court's review.

With regard to matters that were previously accepted from out of state attorneys, a certified trial attorney now has three choices upon the matter's resolution. One, they can refuse to pay the referral fee "earned" at the time of referral and risk a claim for breach of contract. Two, they can pay the referral fee in the face of a clear pronouncement by the ACPE that the payment of such a fee is not ethical and risk prosecution for an ethical violation. Three, they can retain the referral fee funds until the potential review of Opinion 745 is resolved. Each option presents legal, ethical, or practical problems.

The tax ramifications of case proceeds being held in an attorney's account are even more pressing for attorneys/law firms who operate on a June 30 to July 1 fiscal year. Attorneys and their accountants are diligently trying to determine how best to account for those funds in a manner that complies with the attorney's ethical obligations and does not run afoul of any tax requirements. Attorneys could conceivably have to hold funds for many months and potentially even more than a year.

Finally, attorneys are concerned about their potential clients. Out of state attorneys may delay referring cases to a New Jersey attorney to await the outcome of the Supreme Court review in this matter. That delay may, unknown to the out of state attorney, pose timing issues for litigants in being able to properly exercise their rights, as there are strict time requirements for certain steps in the early stages of certain litigation, such as the need to file a tort claims notice.

In light of these emergent, time sensitive and very real concerns faced by many of its members, and the precedent of previous stays issued in appropriate ACPE matters, the NJSBA respectfully requests that the ACPE stay the effect of Opinion 745 until such time that the Court addresses the filed Petitions for Review.

We understand there may be some procedural requirements that need to be met for the ACPE to consider a request such as this. Please advise if that is the case, and the NJSBA will quickly and diligently work to meet those requirements. Because of the urgent need for definitive guidance on these matters, if the ACPE cannot provide a voluntary stay, or cannot do so in a reasonable timeframe, the NJSBA is prepared to seek a stay from the Supreme Court.

The NJSBA thanks you for your consideration and looks forward to your response and any guidance you may be able to provide. Please contact NJSBA General Counsel Sharon Balsamo with any questions or if you need further information at sbalsamo@njsba.com or 732-937-7505.

Sincerely,



Timothy F. McGoughran, Esq.
President, New Jersey State Bar Association

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EXHIBIT B

From: Renee Greenberg <Renee.Greenberg@law.njoag.gov>
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Subject: RE: In re: Advisory Committee on Professional Ethics Opinion 745, Docket No. 089278

Hi Sharon:

As we discussed last Friday, I met with ACPE to share and discuss NJSBA's request for a stay. The ACPE advised that it cannot grant a stay as the Supreme Court is the proper entity to consider such action.

Please don't hesitate to reach out if you wish to discuss.

Best,
Renee

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****Electronic Communication Preferred****

